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Abstract
This paper addresses how corporate environmentalism can be a means of di¤erentiation and of
green-washing. Since consumers can seldom directly observe a rms environmental quality (a problem
not easily solved through eco-labeling), published environmental reports and advertising can mislead
them. As a result, the role of the NGO becomes both crucial and ambiguous. On the one hand, by
helping to increase consumer awareness, NGOs enlarge the market share of green di¤erentiated rms.
On the other hand, the risk that consumers will punish a rm perceived to be supplying inaccurate
environmental information may bring about the paradoxical result of discouraging di¤erentiation
e¤orts.
JEL classication: L12 - L15 - L31 - M37 - Q50
Key words: Di¤erentiation - Environmental concern - Imperfect competition - Quality
- Advertising - NGO.
1 Introduction
Firms increasingly publish environmental reports (beyond legal constraints) or advertise
their commitment to manage according to sustainable development criterions. What are
their motivations? The most obvious argument might be that it would allow rms to
di¤erentiate their product from the others, in the same way as eco-labeling. Some papers
1
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.97
have stressed that the environmental concern of consumers may increase prot opportuni-
ties for rms which would address the environmental problem seriously (Eriksson [16]). It
is also well known that di¤erentiation lowers competition and increases prots: imperfect
competition would enhance the incentives to use a less polluting production technology.
And as a seemingly paradoxal result, the market forces tend then to alleviate the envi-
ronmental burden. But, even when consumers are concerned about environment, if only
a few rms choose more environmental friendly production processes while the other ones
maintain a low level of care about the environment, imperfect competition may not su¢ ce
as a substitute for environmental regulation.
In fact, the environmental global quality of a rm is seldom directly observable by
consumers and this generates an asymmetric information situation between rms and
consumers. In this case, there is no eco-labeling possibility. Publishing environmental
reports or advertising on the rms approach of sustainable development may be under-
stood like a signal for consumers, i.e. an attempt to reduce uncertainty about its real
environmental quality. But even this signal can be noisy and it might increase, instead of
reduce, the uncertainty for consumers. This paper addresses then an original issue, not
yet analyzed in the existing literature. When rms are perfectly aware of one of their
peculiar characteristics which consumers value but have no mean to know exactly nor to
learn through repeat purchases, are there incentives for rms to choose to provide a higher
quality or even the highest possible one? If not, are there incentives for them to substitute
a high level of advertising about this characteristic instead of actually providing it? By
this way, they might replace a true di¤erentiation with only a perceived one.
Our paper builds then on three distinct streams of the economic literature: endogenous
quality choice in di¤erentiated oligopolistic markets, imperfect information and advertis-
ing.
The standard results about vertical di¤erentiation in duopolistic markets have been
demonstrated by Shaked and Sutton [33], Tirole [36], Crampes and Hollander [12] or
Lehmann-Grube [22]: the high-quality rm will earn higher prots than the low-quality
rm, even when the costs of quality improvement are substantial and increasing. In a
sequential-quality game, the rm that has the rst choice of quality will choose the higher
quality and will earn higher prots than the follower, and like in spatial models, rms are
incited to di¤erentiate their products according to a maximal di¤erentiation principle
(quoting dAspremont et al. [13]). The rst papers focusing on green di¤erentiation were
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Eriksson [16] or Amacher, Koskela and Ollikainen [1] who address specically the issue
of endogenous choice of environmental quality by focusing on eco-labeling which is a way
of asserting quality without any uncertainty about environmental friendliness of product.
Conrad [11] shows that the level of green di¤erentiation chosen by a duopoly is not socially
optimal.
Many studies show indeed that imperfect information (among producers) may distort
product di¤erentiation. In the case of spatial competition, it depends on the assumption
about transportation costs: such a distorsion appears when these costs are linear (Boyer
et al. [7]) whereas it is not the case under quadratic costs assumption (Boyer et al.
[8]). In case of vertical di¤erentiation, Bester [6] argues that imperfect information about
the quality of goods reduces the producers incentives for product di¤erentiation: the
centrifugal force of the maximum di¤erentiation principle (of dAspremont et al. [13])
is eliminated when consumers are uncertain about quality and use observed prices to
ascertain the quality of goods.
Fishman and Simhon [18] argue that, when producers are privately informed about
quality, signalling models can successfully explain an equilibrium correlation between
prices and exogenous quality but do not account for incentives to invest in quality im-
provement. They show that, when buyers are uninformed about quality, there are no
incentives at all for a monopolist to invest in quality. But such incentives do exist and are
all the greater when the consumers can get information at a lower cost: the ability to get
information limits, but does not eliminate, the low quality producers incentive to mimic
the high quality price. One could think that the consumers would be better o¤ if they
could benet from any public information about the quality of the goods (for example
through notation agencies). Schlee [31] establishes that, when there is quality uncertainty
on both sides of the market, (sellers and buyers being uncertain about the quality of the
goods they exchange), there are two circomstances in which, contrary to intuition, con-
sumers may dislike public quality information: in case of increasing returns to scale and
of su¢ cientlyconvex marginal costs. But when costs and demand functions are linear,
information is always valuable to consumers. The specic case of uncertainty bearing on
the environmental characteristics has been studied by Mahenc [25] who analyzes the use
of high prices to signal greener products.
In order to study the incentives to provide high quality when the consumers are not
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perfectly aware of the products quality, Schmalensee [32] or Smallwood and Conlisk [35]
incorporate learning into consumer choice by assuming that quality is positively related
to the probability of repeat purchase. Their works rely on the distinction introduced by
Nelson [29] between search goods and experience goods. The characteristics of the
former are evident on inspection while the quality of the latter is impossible to verify,
except through use of the product. Nelsons crucial insight was that the mere fact that a
particular brand of an experience good was advertised could be a signal to customers that
the brand was of high quality (Nelson [30]). He argues that, in case of experience goods,
there may be incentives to lie since rms claims are not easily veriable and lies might
induce trial purchases.
Generally, this kind of issue is addressed with repeat sales mechanisms (like Schmalensee
[32] or Smallwood and Conlisk [35]). Schmalensee shows that, when the unit-cost advan-
tage enjoyed by low-quality is great and when there are economies of scale for advertising,
there exist equilibria in which the lowest-quality brands advertise most, have the largest
market shares and are the most protable: in this case, a high level of advertising does
not signal high quality. In Bester [6] also, consumers are a priori uninformed but learn
actual quality after consuming a unit of the good. But Shapiro [34] notices that this
approach was not based on rational consumer decisionmaking and prefers to address the
issue of endogenous quality choice for a monopoly by underlining the role of reputation.
At any date, each consumer has some expectations regarding product quality: these ex-
pectations constitute the rms reputation, which determines the position of its demand
curve. Consumer learning involves adjusting expected quality toward true quality.
Models dealing with experience goods, such as Milgrom and Roberts [27], generally
assume that there is no credible direct way by which the rm can provide the information
about quality before customers make their initial purchase decision. The rms decision
variables are the price and the advertising expenditure. Customers, after observing price
and adverstising expenditures, make their initial purchase decisions and, through direct use
of the product or communication with other users, then gain information about quality.
Smallwood and Conlisk [35] consider a market, in which the product lasts one period,
each consumer buys one unit of the product each period, there are a given number of
brands and there is a positive breakdown probability (which di¤ers among brands) which
may not be discovered by inspection. When the purchased product breakdowns, the
customer considers a change of brand. The breakdown probability can be interpreted in a
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broader sense: this is the dissatisfaction probability. Shapiro [34] considers that reputation
increases as sales increases, and converges to the actual quality. His specication is in some
extent consistent with the explanation through repeat sales but also with optimization.
If we consider the environmental friendliness or the level of sustainability commitments,
it can be seen as a quality associated to the good but this quality is hardly known by the
consumers. Such a good cannot be considered a search goodbecause this characteristic
of the rm is not evident on simple inspection, nor as an experience goodbecause this
characteristic is impossible to verify even through use of the products. In this case repeat
purchases do not provide any further information about the true level of environmental
friendliness of the rm. The environmental friendliness of the rm has to be considered
more as a credence quality, as dened by Darby and Karni [14]: credence qualities
are those which, although worthwile, cannot be evaluated in normal use. In such cases,
regulation becomes more necessary but it is specially di¢ cult and the informational issue
may be dealt with if there is a possibility of a punishment when the consumers become
aware of a fraud about quality.
In our case, apparently exogenous events may provide such information and reveal the
actual quality of a product or of its producer: an oil slick, for example, should reveal
that the oil company cheated about prevention measures. Consumer learning depends
on the fullment of such events which undermine then the reputation of the rm. But
this requires strong punishments, which individual consumers cannot enact, except by
collective actions. There are also independent notation agencies or NGOs which provide
evaluations of the degree of reliability of environmental reports or advertising campaigns,
but such agencies are unable to exactly verify the announced quality either of a product
or of a rm. So, even if public information might be valued by consumers, there is no way
to provide them with accurate information. Any environmental disaster caused by the
rm or any disclosure by an NGO of its true friendliness will increase the dissatisfaction
probability of the consumers. This will reduce the incentive to cheat for the rm.
Our paper therefore proposes a three-stage model of an asymmetric di¤erentiated mar-
ket with asymmetric information between consumers and rms. One of the competitive
rms can choose to adopt a cleaner technology or to announce a greater environmental
friendliness, and then become a monopolist facing a competitive fringe. At the rst stage,
the monopolist chooses the actual quality of their product by investing in a given produc-
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tion technology, more or less environmental friendly. At the second stage, it invests in
advertising expenditure to claim the environmental quality of its behavior: it decides for
example to publish environmental reports or to publicly sign a charter on sustainable de-
velopment. Contrary to Dixit and Norman [15] who assume that advertising can change
consumers tastes, we assume that consumers preference for quality remains unchanged
but that advertising modies their expected quality for the advertised rm. Until any
veriable information appears about the true quality of this product, advertising on the
environmental friendliness of the rm may induce consumers to overvalue the good (if the
rm is cheating). To publish environmental reports or to claim that the rm is managed
according to sustainable development principles is a way for the rm to improve its repu-
tation. Using a similar idea of Kotowitz and Mathewson [21], we assume that the expected
quality of a product for a consumer characterized by his tastes increases with advertising
expenditures, and is never less than the actual quality, if rms are rational. But, at the
same time, NGOs may audit rms and detect them as cheaters. In the third stage, the
monopoly determines its price and the producers compete in the goods market. We show
that the most environmentally e¢ cient rm is generally induced to advertise, depending
on the availability of public information about the quality, the characteristics of the de-
mand side of the market, and on the cost di¤erential between rms. The role of NGOs
may have ambiguous e¤ects on the choice of di¤erentiation, because it can increase the
demand faced by the monopolist by increasing the size of the global market but it might
also increase the consumersskepticism and then reduce their demand to the di¤erentiated
monopolist.
Section 2 develops our model of di¤erentiation choice by a monopolist facing a compet-
itive fringe under perfect competition. Section 3 compares the choices of the monopolist
to the optimal output of the social planners program. Section 4 presents the main results
about the impact of imperfect information and claims about sustainable di¤erentiation.
In section 5 we analyze the inuence of NGOs on the market and on the global impact on
environment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The choice of di¤erentiation under perfect information
We assume the market originally competitive but one rm is able to develop or to buy a
new technology which allows it to produce the same good while di¤erentiating from the
other producers by their environmental friendliness (less waste, lower emissions). Since
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consumers are sensitive to the environmental reputation of producers, this rm becomes
a monopolist while the others constitute a competitive fringe. The level of environmental
friendliness of the fringe is perfectly known and assumed to be zero ; it corresponds to
a constant global impact coe¢ cient . This impact on the environment can be a com-
bination of negative ones (pollution) and positive ones (amenities). For simplicity, we
will assume that the global environmental impact of a rm is proportional to its output.
Our framework is very close to Mahenc [24] who studies the wine market provided by a
competitive fringe of producers of ordinary wine and by a monopolist producing a wine of
higher quality, nevertheless a¤ected by uncertainty due to weather conditions and other
uncontrollable factors. However, we depart from this framework because the market is
not assumed to be intrinsically di¤erentiated by other characteristics than environmen-
tal friedliness. Like Conrad [11] in the duopoly case, we will focus on the choice of the
environmental quality.
In Lehmann-Grube [22], the costs of quality are independent of output and convex in
the chosen quality: there are here no variable costs of quality. At the contrary, in Crampes
and Hollander [12], the unit cost of output depends on quality. In our case, we have to
consider that quality is related to pollutant emissions: there are both xed costs (to obtain
or to buy a cleaner technology) and variable costs (abatement costs). The e¤ect of xed
costs have already been analysed by Amacher et al. [1]. We assume for simplicity reason
that they are only variable costs for the environmental friendliness , and the production
cost writes c()q with c0() > 0 and c00()  0. As the quality of the product is dened by
the environmental friendliness of the producer, we can assume that the emission coe¢ cient
of the monopoly is equal to    and its emissions are e = (   ) q. The production cost
of the competitive rms is normalized to zero and thus the price of their product is also
zero.
As a rst step, we will study the case of perfect information, where there is no possi-
bility for the rm to delude the consumers. In this case, the game reduces to two stages:
the choice of di¤erentiation and the stage of determination of the demand and the price
for a given di¤erentiation level.
The general framewok of consumer behavior is inspired by Tirole [36], Choi and Shin
[10], Lehmann-Grube [22] or Amacher et al. [1] but if each rm knows the actual, realized
quality of its product, the potential customers do not. Instead of considering vertical
7
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.97
di¤erentiation, we take into account the fact that consumers are not unanimous about the
value of the environmental friendliness of the producer from whom they buy the product.
Therefore, we use a spatial di¤erentiated model and the choice of quality by the rms
becomes a location choice. Consumers receive the same utility U when consuming a unit
of the good but they di¤er in their taste parameter  (marginal willingness to pay for
environmental performance) uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

. A rationale for
this assumption may be the one given by Tirole [36], and used by Arora and Gangopadhyay
[2], who relate the heterogeneity of the marginal willingness to pay to the heterogeneity
of marginal utility of income. The number of consumers is standardized to unity. In this
benchmark case, we assume that information is absolutely perfect and symmetric about
the environmental friendliness of the rm, denoted by e.
At the last stage each consumer buys at most one unit from either the monopoly or
from the other competitive rms and gets a net utility from buying an expected qualitye  , at price p. A consumer with environmental awareness  will buy from the rm that
o¤ers the best quality-price combination for her (if her utility is positive). She will su¤er
a marginal disutility measured by t when buying a good that does not correspond to his
ideal, and the costs of transportationare assumed to be quadratic (unlike in Conrad [11]
who deals with linear costs). The expected utility of the agent purchasing the homogeneous
good is then given by U   t2 while her expected utility if she bought the di¤erentiated
good would be U   p  t(   e)2. The market is split, and the marginal consumer who is
indi¤erent between purchasing the homogeneous good or the di¤erentiated one is dened
by i such that:
U   t2i = U   p  t(i   e)2
which gives
i =
e
2
+
p
2te
The demand for the good produced by the monopoly is then
D(p;e) =    i =    e
2
  p
2te (1)
The prot function of the monopoly writes as
(p;e) = p  c(e)D(p;e)
8
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It maximizes this prot by choosing its price p, for given environmental friendliness e:
p =
c(e)
2
+ te    e
2
!
(2)
This price will be above the marginal production cost if and only if the di¤erentiation
is su¢ cient, that is:
(   e)2 < 2   c(e)
t
(3)
For low levels of production cost , it is easiest for the monopoly to obtain a price
greater than the marginal cost without seeking a too large di¤erentiation.
Assumption 1: c()  t2
Under this assumption, which ensures that both the margin of the monopolist and
its demand are non négative for e =  and more generally for any e 2 0; , the range
of environmental awareness is large enough, relatively to the ratio of the production cost
depending on quality to the transportation cost, for allowing the level of di¤erentiation to
cover the entire interval.
At the second stage, the di¤erentiated rm chooses its level of environmental friendli-
ness, by maximizing its expected prot, which leads to the following necessary conditions:
@(p;e)
@e

p(e) =
h
p(e)  c(e)i @D
@e +D

@p
@e   c0(e)

= 0 (4)
@2(p;e)
@e2

p(e)  0 for any
e 2 0;  (5)
Proposition 1 When the willingnesses to pay for environmental friendliness of the con-
sumers are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

, the optimal level of di¤erentiation
for the monopolist under perfect information is  <  such that
 
     c0()
2t
.
Proof. The optimal price, for any given environmental quality, writes p(e) = c(e)2 +
te    e2 while the demand is D(e) = 12    e2   c(e)4te . This allows to obtain the
following derivatives: 8>>><>>>:
@p
@e   c0(e) =  c
0(e)
2
+ t

   e
@D
@e =  14   ec
0(e)  c(e)
4te2
(6)
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@(p;e)
@e

p(e) =
h
p(e)  c(e)i @D
@e|{z}
 
+D

@p
@e   c0(e)

| {z }
+= 
= 0 (7)
Under Assumption 1, a necessary condition for this FOC to admit a solution  is
that the price e¤ect is positive, but since c0(e)  0 and    e is decreasing, this will
be veried if and only if    with  such that t       c0()2 . If the cost conditions
are such that the rst order condition is veried, it can only be for e  . If this FOC
does not admit any solution in

0; 

, since the marginal prot equals zero for e = 0 and
decreases when e increases, the prot is maximized for e = . QED
3 The choice of the social planner
Does the level of environmental friendliness chosen by the rm coincide with the optimal
one? Intuitively, it cannot be optimal, for the simple and usual reason that the social
planner would wish to reduce the competitive distorsion and to take account for the
environmental damage that the rm ignores.
Since we have assumed that the emissions coe¢ cient of the producers is linked to their
environmental friendliness :  for the competitive fringe and  e, let us dene the damage
due to emissions: d(e) with d0(e) > 0 and d00(e)  0.
The objective of the social planner is then to maximize the aggregate social welfare,
considering that each unit produced by the competitive fringe is the source of a damage
d() and each unit purchased from the monopolist cause a damage d(   e) :
maxe W =
Z i
0

U   t2   d() d + Z 
i
h
U   c(e)  t(   e)2   d(   e)i d (8)
From the social point of view, the indi¤erent consumer between buying the homoge-
neous good or the di¤erentiated one is dened by i such that:
U   t2i = U   c(e)  t(i   e)2
which leads
i =
c(e)
2te + e2
10
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As expected, for a given quality, the optimal market share of the environmental friendly
rm is greater than the monopolists market share.
We compute rst the expression of the social welfare, for a given quality of the mo-
nopolist, and then we derive the FOC of this maximization program.
dW
de =      i
h
c0(e)  d0(   e)  t +i   2ei
+
di
de
h
c(e)  d() + d(   e) + te2   2tiei
s.t. i =
c(e)
2te + e2
di
de = 12 + 12t c
0(e)e   c(e)e2 = 12 + c
0(e)
2te   c(e)2te2
The optimal level of environmental friendliness  of the di¤erentiated rm is then de-
ned by a standard, even complicated, equalization between marginal costs and benets,
weighted by the respective market shares of the two kinds of producers. Regarding the
purchasers of the di¤erentiated good
 
  i

, any increase in the environmental friend-
liness of the rm will be judged as regards to the di¤erence between the marginal cost of
this increase in quality c0(e), the avoided marginal damage d0( e) and the di¤erence im-
plied for the transportation costs t

 +i   2e. In addition, this increase in the quality
generates a switch in the demand from the generic good toward the di¤erentiated good
di
de which has to be valued by the di¤erence between the production cost c(e) and the
xed damage d(), and the change in the transportation costs.
The following intuitive proposition can be proved by comparison of the explicit expres-
sions of the rst-order conditions between this program and the previous one.
Proposition 2 When the willingnesses to pay for environmental friendliness of the con-
sumers are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

the level of di¤erentiation chosen
by the monopolist under perfect information  is less than the optimal one .
4 The choice of di¤erentiation with uninformed consumers
Our second step addresses the optimal choice of di¤erentiation of the rm in case it
is possible to lie to the consumers and hence to exaggerate its level of environmental
friendliness.
The decision process of the monopoly is now described by a three-stage game. At the
rst stage of the game, the monopoly chooses its true environmental friendliness e (like in
11
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Lehmann- Grube [22] for a duopoly case) but in the second stage of the game, instead of
disclosing this true quality to the consumers, it chooses a level of advertising expenditures
and thus to display a greater environmental friendliness (or equivalently a smaller emission
coe¢ cient) a > e. At the third stage, the rm determines the price by maximizing prot
and supplies the demand. As usual, the model is solved using backward induction.
The core of the model is the assumption that the monopolist chooses a given level
of environmental friendliness but may have some incentives to let consumers think that
this quality is even higher than the true one. Such a result can be obtained through
environmental partial disclosures (like in Lyon and Maxwell [23]) or through advertisement.
Assume that the rm can buy a technology which will enable it to produce with quality e
that is unknown by the consumers, and that the producer invests in advertising in order to
mislead the consumers by displaying a greater environmental friendliness a. But any such
attempt of cheating is costly. And, more crucially, in a context characterized by imperfect
information, consumers are more or less aware of the rms incentive to cheat. Here come
the environmental NGOs on. We will later discuss their role more thoroughly, but in this
part, let us formulate one of the most natural assumption about it: in general, NGOs
can scrutinize the environmental disclosure of the rms, and they can eventually detect
cheating attempts and disclose the true level of environmental friendliness. A typical model
of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium would introduce the action of NGOs and then formalize
the expected quality of the rm as the result of the consumers beliefs formation according
to the information given by the NGOs or by the rm, and to the level of condence of
consumers respectively in rms and NGOs. By denoting by  the probability for consumers
that the rm tells the truth and (1  ) that the NGOs are right, this could be modelled
as: b = a + (1  )e
Unless assuming that  is itself endogenous, we can simplify the reasoning and adopt
a reduced form for this process. We suppose that the rm advertises a greater level of
quality than true but that the information given by the NGOs weakens the e¢ ciency of
the advertising campaigns, or equivalently, increases its costs for cheating. This combined
process results in an expected quality for consumers b > e. Let us denote  = b   e the
size of the obtained cheating. The cost of obtaining this level of quality over-statement is
due both to the cost of the advertising campaign and to the fact that the NGOs reduced
the e¢ ciency of the campaign. To summarize, we can set that the cost of the perceived
12
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over-statement of quality is A() with A0() > 0 and A00()  0.
Compared to the previous model under perfect information, the rst stage is similar
in the spirit, except that the producer maximises its prot given its true production cost
depending on e while the demand depends on b.8>>><>>>:
D(p;b) =    i =    b
2
  p
2tb
p(e;b) = c(e)
2
+ tb    b
2
! (9)
or equivalently 8>>>><>>>>:
D(e; ) = 1
2
 
  
e + 
2
!
  c(
e)
4t
e + 
p(e; ) = c(e)
2
+ t
e +     e + 
2
! (10)
We intercalate here a second stage between the rst one where the rm chooses its
true level of di¤erentiation and the last one where the demand and price are determined.
At this stage, the already di¤erentiated rm chooses the level of advertising, for a given
true environmental friendliness. It is worth noting here that if the rm has incentive to
cheat because any increase in its environmental friendliness is costly, it has also incentive
to really di¤erentiate because advertising under the pressure of NGOs is costly as well.
The prot can be rewritten as
(e; ) = hp(e; )  c(e)iD(e; ) A() (11)
Proposition 3 When the willingnesses to pay for environmental friendliness of the un-
informed consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

, there are incentives
for the di¤erentiated monopolist to cheat by exaggerating its environmental friendliness:
  0.
Proof. By using the envelope theorem, we nd
@(p;e; )
@

p(e;) =
h
p(e; )  c(e)i @D
@| {z }
+= 
+D
@p
@| {z }
+
 A0()| {z }
+
= 0 (12)
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because 8>>>>><>>>>>:
@p
@
= t
 
  
e + 
2
!
  12 t
e +  = t   e +  = t   b
@D
@
=  1
4
+
c(e)
4t
e + 2
The e¤ect on price is strictly positive since the seeming di¤erentiation is not maximal.
No increase in price could be obtained by overpassing the upper limit of the consumers
environmental concerns. One can show that there is an upper limit to the cheating of the
rm above which any additional cheating will lead to a decrease in the demand:
 
s
c(e)
2t
  e (13)
If
q
c(e)
2t   e  0, the demand increases for any lower level of cheating but decreases
above it. If this condition happens not to be met (after the choice of the real level of
di¤entiation), the demand would decrease when the cheating increases.
Conditionally that the demand e¤ect (if negative) is less than the price e¤ect, there is
an incentive for the rm to increase its seeming level of environmental friendliness, until
the marginal benet of doing so equalizes the marginal cost of advertising. QED
Proposition 4 When the willingnesses to pay for environmental friendliness of the unin-
formed consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

, the announced environ-
mental friendliness by the di¤erentiated monopolist (b) is equal to the level chosen under
perfect information  if and only if A0() = D()c0(). In all other cases, the annonced
level of environmental friendliness is di¤erent than under perfect information: if the mar-
ginal cost of environmental friendliness is greater than the marginal cost of advertising,
the rm will choose to announce b > .
Proof. Let us rewrite in b the FOC of this probleme (eq. 12) and compare it with the
FOC of the previous model under perfect information (eq. 4).
@(p;e;b)
@b

p(e;b) =
h
p(e;b)  c(e)i @D(b)
@b| {z }
+= 
+D(b)@p(e;b)
@b| {z }
+
 A0(b)| {z }
+
= 0 (14)
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@(p;e)
@e

p(e) =
h
p(e)  c(e)i @D(e)
@e| {z }
 
+D(e)@p
@e   c0(e)

| {z }
+= 
= 0 (15)
Assume that b = . It would lead to A0() = D()c0(). If this condition is not met,
the solutions of these two equations are then di¤erent: b 6= . QED
Lastly, at the rst stage, the rm chooses its true level of environmental friendliness,
knowing that it will be led to announce a greater environmental concern and expecting
the price and demand.
Proposition 5 When the willingnesses to pay for environmental friendliness of the unin-
formed consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval

0; 

, the true environmental
friendliness of the di¤erentiated monopolist is also di¤erent from the optimal one under
perfect information.
Proof. By using again the envelope theorem, one obtains
@(p;e; )
@e

p(e;) =
h
p(e; )  c(e)i @D(e; ")
@e| {z }
+= 
+D(e; ")"@p(e; )
@e   c0(e)
#
| {z }
+= 
= 0 (16)
which is only seemingly similar to eq. 4 because of the impact of the cheating .8>>>>><>>>>>:
@D(e; ")
@e =  14  
e +  c0(e)  c(e)
4t
e + 2 Q 0
@p(e + ")
@e   c0(e) =  c
0(e)
2
+ t

  
e +  Q 0
The intuition allows to think that it should be less that the level  chosen by the rm
under perfect information. But it remains to be showed. What is also intuitive is that there
are absolutely no reason to hope that the monopolists choice could converge towards the
optimal level of environmental friendliness, .
5 The role of NGOs
One can observe that NGOs have in general two lines of action. Some of them decide to
directly cooperate with rms in order to inuence their behavior, but most of them remain
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external to the rms. They question and audit their practices but the greatest part of
their e¢ ciency comes from the inuence they exert on consumers. What is the nature of
this inuence? One can think that NGOs have two crucial roles on consumers: on the one
hand, they increase their information about environmental issues and hence can increase
their environmental awareness; on the other hand, they increase their ability to analyze
the environmental claims of rms and can increase the consumersskepticism about them.
During the second period, environmental NGOs can audit the monopoly and detect
the cheating, or not. If it does not occur, rms maintain the same prices as during the rst
period because consumers have no reason to modify their demand. But if such an event
occurs, it reveals that the responsible rm was less environmental friendly than initially
perceived by the consumers due to advertising expenses. Some consumers who were misled
about quality can decide to buy the other product.
5.1 Increase of the green awareness of consumers
We can elaborate three assumptions concerning the increase of green awareness allowed by
the actions of NGOs. One can rst consider that all consumers are not a¤ected in the same
way by the NGOs, the more sentitive to green arguments becoming the more a¤ected by the
NGOs campaigns and the less concerned being quite indi¤erent to them. This hypothesis
can have two di¤erent meanings: the range of the green concern can be enlarged, or
the distribution of the green concerns will be modied. One could also imagine that all
consumers are equally a¤ected by advertising, whatever their environmental concern, the
range of the consumers tastes for the environment being translated from

0; 

towardh
; 
i
with  > 0 and     = . In the real world, the impact of the action of NGOs
certainly results in a combination of these three motions.
In this paper, we will focus on the rst case. Assuming that the range of green awareness
enlarges, without a¤ecting the less sensitive consumer, means that  increases. One can
then examine the consequences of this increase in . Because the number of consumers
does not change, the increase of  means a decrease in the density function characterizing
their distribution. This case is represented by Figure 2, where the colored area symbolizes
the density of the distribution of consumers over the interval of green awareness.
16
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Figure 2
Under perfect information, like under imperfect information of consumers about its
environmental friendliness, one can expect that the choices of the monopolist are just
translated towards greater environmental friendliness, its market share being nevertheless
modied because the demand to the monopolist is not simply proportional to . Let us
precise the impacts of a change in , in the case of perfect information, on (e):
@
h
p(e)  c(e)i
@
= te
@D
@
=
1
2
As the demand and the margin of any monopolist e increase with , its prot in-
creases. But the e¤ect of the rise in  on the choice of its environmental friendliness by
the monopolist is more ambiguous, as it is established by Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 When the maximal willingness to pay for environmental friendliness  of
the uninformed consumers is increased to , the consumers becoming uniformly distributed
on the interval
h
0; 
i
, the level of quality chosen by the monopolist increases if and only
if
tD()e() < tD()   12 [p()  c()] e(), where e() < 0 is the elastic-
ity of the demand addressed to the monopolist relatively to its choice of environmental
friendliness.
Proof. Let us compute the e¤ects of a change in , in the case of perfect information, on
0():
@0()
@
= tD()e()| {z }
 
+ tD()  1
2
[p()  c()] e()| {z }
 
where e() < 0 is the elasticity of the demand addressed to the monopolist relatively
to its choice of environmental friendliness. It is easy to see in the above equation that
 has a negative impact on 0() because of the demand e¤ect of any change in the
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quality but has also a positive impact through the price e¤ect. Both e¤ects depend on
the demand elasticity e(). The monopolist will choose a greater level of quality if
and only if @0()=@ or equivalently if and only the change in  increases the marginal
prot obtained in : as 0() becomes positive and because of the concavity of the prot
function, the prot will be maximized for a higher level of quality.
Even in this simple case, the role of the NGOs is ambiguous, since it does not always
allow to reach a greater level of environmental concern of the monopolist, and then a lower
level of polluting emissions.
5.2 Increase of the consumersinformation/skepticism
Once again, consumers condence in the monopolys claims might be equally a¤ected by
the action of the NGOs or it might be inuenced at di¤erent extent, depending on their
green awareness and on the action of NGOs. One of the most natural assumption about
this e¤ect is to assume that the information given by th NGOs weaken the e¢ ciency of the
advertising campaigns of the monopolist, or equivalently, increase its costs for cheating.
Under this assumption, the incentives to cheat weaken, the chosen level of fraud decreases
and the level of the announced and of the true environmental friendliness get closer to the
optimal level chosen under perfect competition.
But this is a quite optimistic wiew of the impact of the NGOs attacks on cheating
rms. It relies on perfect valuations by the NGO of the environmental friendliness of the
rm and on the perfect condence of consumers in the NGOs audit. But the attacks of
NGOs on some rms may increase the global skepticism of the consumers about the claims
of all rms.
On can then describe this set of assumptions by assuming that the consumers do not
accept any more the level of the announced environmental friendliness as a fact but form
their own expectations of this quality by weighting the announced one with a lower limit
for the true one, this limit being arbitrarily dropped as the consumers skepticism get
worse. bb = |{z}
NGO&
b + (1  ) 0|{z}
NGO&
As a result, if the expected level of environmental concern of the monopolist happens
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to be lower than the true one would be under perfect information, the demand expressed
by consumers is lower and the rm may be compelled to choose a level of environmental
quality below the level of perfect information.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that, when the consumers cannot acquire accurately informa-
tion about the environmental friendliness of the rms, the most environmentally e¢ cient
rm is generally induced to advertise and to cheat about its true level of environmental
concern, the characteristics of the demand side of the market, and on the cost di¤erential
between the monopolist and the other rms. The role of NGOs may have ambiguous e¤ects
on the choice of di¤erentiation, because it can increase the demand faced by the monop-
olist by increasing the size of the global market but it might also increase the consumers
skepticism and then reduce their demand to the di¤erentiated monopolist.
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